HAYAT: weekly news from twelve crisis regions

After more than two years of war, the Gaza Strip is largely destroyed: according to a UNOSAT assessment as of June 16, 2026, 82 percent of all buildings were damaged or destroyed, and almost the entire population of approximately 2.1 million people has been displaced multiple times. The Palestinian Ministry of Health reported at least 73,914 Palestinians killed by September 20, 2026; in August 2025, the IPC officially declared famine conditions for the Gaza City Governorate, with around 500,000 people in "catastrophic" Phase 5.

A ceasefire has been in effect since October 10, 2025, but the Israeli army remains present beyond the "yellow line" across more than half of the Gaza Strip; between the ceasefire taking effect and January 21, 2026, the OHCHR counted at least 383 Palestinians killed by Israeli attacks, in addition to 80 killed by Hamas fighters. Winter storm "Byron" destroyed more than 42,000 tents and damaged emergency shelters for around 235,000 displaced people in December 2025; at least 18 people died due to building collapses.

Since October 2023, according to OCHA, 596 humanitarian aid workers have been killed, including 393 UNRWA staff (as of August 5, 2026). Reconstruction is only in its infancy: the final damage assessment by the UN, EU, and World Bank (April 2026) puts the need for reconstruction and recovery at 71.4 billion US dollars over the coming decade, with the 2026 Flash Appeal calling for over four billion US dollars for emergency aid alone. In the West Bank, OCHA registered 1,109 Palestinians killed by Israeli security forces or settlers between October 7, 2023, and June 29, 2026, including at least 243 children; destruction of homes, displacement from the Tulkarem and Nur Shams camps, and settler violence continue to increase.

Sources: UNRWA, Situation Report #235 (October 1, 2026), OCHA oPt, Reported Impact Snapshots (August 5 and September 9, 2026), OCHA oPt Humanitarian Situation Report (August 7, 2026), Gaza RDNA by UN, EU, and World Bank (April 2026), IPC (July 23, 2026). As of: October 2026.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad on December 8, 2024, ended a 13-year civil war that claimed more than 500,000 lives and displaced half the population; a transitional government under Ahmed al-Sharaa (formerly Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS) has since assumed power. Despite the political turnaround, OCHA reports that some 15.6 million people require humanitarian aid in 2026, more than 90 percent live below the poverty line, and, according to the UN, Syria is experiencing its worst drought in over 36 years, with serious consequences for water supply and harvests.

Between December 2024 and early October 2026, the UNHCR registered the return of around 1.82 million Syrian refugees from abroad and around 2.04 million internally displaced persons, who returned to often-destroyed homes and areas containing unexploded ordnance.

The situation for minorities is precarious: In March 2025, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and the UN, over 1,000 people were killed in massacres along the Alawite-dominated Mediterranean coast in Latakia, Tartus, and Hama, many in retaliatory killings by pro-government fighters. In July 2025, violence escalated in the Druze-dominated governorate of As-Suwayda; Israel carried out airstrikes in Damascus and claimed to be protecting the Druze. Following an offensive in January 2026, Damascus forced the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration (DAANES) and the SDF into an integration agreement that mandates the handover of Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and all oil and border facilities. The 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan, which required 3.2 billion US dollars, was only about 36 percent funded by the end of the year.

Sources: OCHA, Syria Humanitarian Response Plan 2026 (April 2026), UNHCR, Refugee Returns and IDP Returns Dashboards (as of 1 October 2026), EUAA / SNHR, Coastal Violence March 2025, UN News (November 2025). As of: October 2026.

According to OCHA assessments, Lebanon is facing its most severe humanitarian situation in decades, the result of the 2024 Hezbollah-Israel war, an ongoing economic and banking crisis since 2019, and a renewed escalation that began in March 2026. Following the ceasefire brokered in November 2024, Israel conducted nearly daily airstrikes in the south and the Beqaa Valley according to the OHCHR; by November 2025, at least 331 people had been killed, including 127 civilians.

On March 2, 2026, the conflict openly erupted again: by August 17, the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health reported at least 4,346 deaths and 12,303 injuries; at the height of the displacement in March, IOM data indicated that over one million people were internally displaced, with approximately 330,000 still displaced as of September 29; many have been returning since a ceasefire announcement on June 19, but attacks in the south continue; about 14 percent of the national territory has been covered by Israeli evacuation orders. More than 40,000 residential buildings in the south had already been destroyed before the new escalation, and reconstruction has stalled.

Economically, about half of the population lives below the poverty line; among Syrian refugees, extreme poverty affects nine out of ten households, and in 2025, the UNHCR was forced to drastically cut cash assistance and healthcare services due to a 26 percent funding level. Following the fall of Assad in December 2024, the UNHCR reported that approximately 362,000 Syrian refugees had returned to Syria from Lebanon by September 2025; at the same time, more than 105,000 new refugees arrived from Syria, and about 661,000 Syrians remained registered in the country. According to OCHA estimates, 24 percent of the total population is at risk of acute food insecurity.

Sources: OCHA, Lebanon Flash Update #51 (as of 24 August 2026), IOM DTM Lebanon Round 118 (as of 29 September 2026), OHCHR Update on the Human Rights Situation in Lebanon (April 2026), UNHCR Lebanon Operational Update (September 2025). As of: October 2026.

In Iran, the human rights situation deteriorated in an unprecedented manner in 2025: according to counts by Iran Human Rights and ECPM, Iranian authorities executed at least 1,639 people, an increase of 68 percent compared to 2024 and the highest level since 1989. Among those executed were at least 48 women and six juvenile offenders; about half of the executions were for drug offenses, and many others followed proceedings in Revolutionary Courts, which, according to Amnesty International, do not meet basic standards for fair trials.

The UN Special Rapporteur on Iran and the OHCHR described the death penalty in October 2025 as an "instrument for the intimidation of society." Women's rights activists such as Sharifeh Mohammadi, Pakhshan Azizi, Verisheh Moradi, and 67-year-old Zahra Tabari were sentenced to death in 2025, solely because of activism, banners, or audio recordings.

In the course of the armed confrontation with Israel in June 2025, authorities intensified domestic political repression, according to Amnesty, including executions for alleged espionage and mass arrests; ethnic minorities, particularly Baluchis, Kurds, and Afghans, were disproportionately affected, for instance through the killings of Kurdish kulbars (porters) and Baluch "soukhtbars" (fuel carriers). Additionally, there were executions of protesters from the "Woman, Life, Freedom" movement, such as Mojahed Kourkouri (June 2025), and in 2025, more than 1.8 million Afghans were unlawfully deported to Afghanistan. Between late February and late June 2026, the confrontation with Israel escalated again: according to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, at least 3,465 people were killed, including approximately 1,460 civilians, and more than 34,000 were injured (as of August 5, 2026), including at least 383 children killed according to OCHA counts (as of late May), before a ceasefire was agreed upon at the end of June; in mid-July 2026, the attacks flared up again. Economically, the effects of sanctions, a devaluation of the rial, and war damage are palpable: the standard of living for large parts of the population is falling, and electricity and water supplies are unstable in many regions.

Sources: Amnesty International, Human Rights in Iran 2025, OHCHR, UN experts on the wave of executions (September 29, 2025), OCHA Iran Humanitarian Update No. 05 (May 31, 2026), IFRC, Iran Complex Emergency Operation Update No. 1 (August 5, 2026). As of: August 2026.

After more than a decade of civil war, Yemen is, according to OCHA, one of the world's most severe humanitarian crises: in 2025, 19.5 million people need aid, 1.3 million more than in 2024, and according to the UN aid plan, this will rise to more than 22 million in 2026. The front lines between the Houthis (who control around 70 percent of the population) and the internationally recognized government and its allies had been largely frozen since the 2022 ceasefire; however, since the escalation on the west coast in the summer of 2026, new fighting, particularly in Taiz and Lahij, has displaced around 184,000 people as of October 4, according to IOM figures. At the same time, the economy, banks, and public services are collapsing; public sector salaries have been paid irregularly for years, and the Yemeni rial lost value dramatically in 2025.

Hunger has reached its worst level since 2022: in September 2025, according to the IPC, 18.1 million people were acutely food insecure (IPC 3+), 41,000 of whom were in Phase 5 (famine conditions); 2.2 million children under five and 1.3 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are acutely malnourished.

A cholera wave has been sweeping across the country since 2024: according to WHO data, Yemen has the highest cholera burden in the world, yet a 20 million US dollar funding gap forced the closure of 47 treatment centers and 234 rehydration centers in 2024/25. Only 59.3 percent of health facilities are still fully functional. The conflict in the Red Sea, in the context of which the Houthis have been attacking international ships since late 2023, as well as Israeli and US airstrikes on Houthi positions, led to port closures, import bottlenecks, and fuel shortages in 2024/25; the Houthi authorities are also increasingly obstructing the work of UN organizations, several employees were arbitrarily detained in 2025, and the withdrawal of donor countries has drastically reduced the protection coverage for around two million particularly vulnerable women and girls.

Sources: OCHA, Yemen Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026 (March 2026), OCHA Yemen Humanitarian Update (September 2025), WHO / UN News, Cholera in Yemen, IOM, Displacement Tracking Matrix (September 30 and October 5, 2026). As of: October 2026.

In the Kurdistan region, hundreds of thousands of people live who have fled from war and persecution, many of them for more than a decade. Families from Syria have found refuge here, joined by internally displaced Iraqis from the years of conflict. Around 97,000 people still live in displacement camps, the last remaining ones in Iraq. They live between two worlds: returning to their places of origin is often not possible, and for many, a true sense of arrival in their current location is also missing.

The fate of the Yazidi survivors is particularly heavy. Around 200,000 of them remain displaced, many living in camps in the Duhok Governorate. Those who wish to return to Sinjar often find neither housing nor water, schools, or healthcare. Over 2,700 people are still considered missing, their families having waited for years for certainty.

The struggle for water is part of the people's daily lives. After above-average winter rainfall, the country's reservoirs recovered noticeably in 2026, but they remain at less than 20 percent of their total capacity. In Sinjar, groundwater remains the only source: more than 75,000 people there are affected by water scarcity, and 15 percent of the residents have already moved away as a result. The heat hits the camp residents the hardest, where drinking water and cooling are scarce. Aid remains underfunded: the UNHCR alone needs around 60.6 million US dollars for its work in Iraq in 2026, 42 percent of which is covered (as of August 2026).

Sources: UNHCR Iraq, Monthly Report August 2026 (September 29, 2026), UNHCR Iraq Operational Data Portal (as of August 31, 2026), IOM DTM Iraq and IOM Iraq Crisis Response Plan 2026, UN Iraq, Rain Brief on the rain and water situation (June 5, 2026), OCHA Governorate Profile Deir ez-Zor (July 2026). As of: October 2026.

Libya remains politically fractured: an internationally recognized government in Tripoli and a rival administration in the east under the influence of General Khalifa Haftar have paralyzed all reforms since the missed election date in 2021. According to OCHA, around 823,000 people are in need of humanitarian aid in 2026, including long-term internally displaced persons, refugees, and asylum seekers as well as migrants; in total, according to IOM figures (Round 63, May to June 2026), around 950,000 migrants were in the country, many amidst smuggling networks and detention centers.

Refugees and migrants are exposed to severe human rights violations according to the IOM, UNHCR, and Amnesty International: arbitrary detention, torture, forced labor, sexual violence, and human trafficking; in 2025, mass graves were discovered in locations including Jakharrah, Alkufra, and the southwest. The Central Mediterranean route remains one of the deadliest migration paths: by September 2025, 19,267 people had been intercepted at sea and returned to Libya, 460 died, and 423 are considered missing.

Two years after Storm Daniel and the collapse of the Derna dams in September 2023, which left over 5,900 dead and thousands missing, many families had not returned to destroyed neighborhoods by 2025 according to UN investigations; reconstruction, drinking water, and healthcare remained inadequate due to corruption and disputes between rival administrations. Since the start of the Sudan war in April 2023, over 567,000 Sudanese have fled to Libya according to UNHCR counts (as of July 2026); only a small fraction of them are officially registered, with most living without formal protected status in overburdened host communities.

Sources: OCHA Libya (2026), IOM DTM Libya Migrant Report Round 63 (May to June 2026), UNHCR Libya Operational Updates (2026), UNHCR CORE Libya, Sudanese refugees and asylum-seekers (July 2026), WHO, Libya Public Health Situation Analysis 2025. Status: September 2026.

The war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has been ongoing since April 15, 2023, has, according to OCHA, created the largest humanitarian crisis in the world and the largest displacement situation ever: around two-thirds of the population, 33.7 million people, will require humanitarian aid in 2026; according to IOM figures, 8.58 million people are living as internally displaced persons within the country (snapshot from September 20, 2026), 26 percent fewer than at the peak, and around 4.6 million people are living as refugees, asylum seekers, or returnees in neighboring countries (UNHCR, as of September 7, 2026); around 5.15 million people have already returned to their places of origin.

Famine was initially confirmed by the IPC in 2024 in Zamzam, Abou Shouk, Al Salam, and parts of Kordofan, and in November 2025 also in El Fasher and Kadugli. The latest IPC analysis from May 2026 no longer classifies any area as an active famine, but still counts 19.5 million people as acutely food insecure, including around 135,000 in the catastrophe phase (IPC 5); the risk of renewed famine during the rainy season remains high. At the end of October 2025, the besieged city of El Fasher in North Darfur fell after more than 500 days of RSF siege; the UN Human Rights Office and the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab subsequently documented "widespread and systematic mass killings," rapes, and the targeted concealment of bodies, followed by the displacement of thousands toward Tawila and Chad.

OHCHR and the UN Special Rapporteur point to large-scale sexual violence, including sexual slavery; 12.2 million people, primarily women and girls, are considered at risk. The SAF has also been linked to retaliatory killings, summary executions, and looting since the recapture of Khartoum in March 2025. Over 110 humanitarian workers have been killed, injured, or abducted since the start of the conflict; the 2025 aid plan, totaling 4.16 billion US dollars, was only about 36 percent funded by the end of 2025.

Sources: OCHA, Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026 (February 2026), IOM DTM Sudan, Displacement and Return Snapshot 9 (September 20, 2026), UNHCR Sudan Situation Weekly Regional Update (September 7, 2026), IPC via WFP/FAO/UNICEF (May 2026), OHCHR (April 2025). Status: September 2026.

According to OCHA, Somalia is facing one of the most complex and protracted humanitarian crises in the world, characterized by more than 30 years of conflict with the Al-Shabaab militia, recurring drought, flooding, and a fragile state apparatus. For 2026, the UN humanitarian response plan classifies 4.8 million people as being in need of assistance—one-fifth fewer than in 2025, a decrease OCHA attributes to stricter needs criteria rather than an improvement in the situation; more than 3.5 million people are internally displaced, one of the highest figures in Africa.

Following four consecutive rainy seasons with below-average rainfall, the Somali federal government declared a national drought emergency on November 10, 2025: 4.6 million people are affected, nearly 500,000 have been forced to migrate since September 2024, and water prices have risen drastically in some regions. According to the latest IPC analysis from September 2026, around 5.1 million Somalis—26 percent of the population analyzed—were acutely food insecure (IPC 3 or higher) from July to September, including around 1.4 million in the emergency phase (IPC 4); around 1.92 million children under the age of five are expected to be acutely malnourished by mid-2027.

Al-Shabaab continues to control parts of southern and central Somalia, levying forced taxes, recruiting child soldiers, and, according to UN data, continuing to commit sexual violence, including forced marriages to fighters; OCHA registered a total of 854 civilian casualties and 1,636 grave violations against children in 2024. Between January and August 2025 alone, more than 141,000 internally displaced persons were forcibly evicted, 81 percent of them in Banadir/Mogadishu. Cholera and measles outbreaks are exacerbating the situation, while funding cuts forced the 2025 humanitarian response plan to reduce its original target of 4.6 million beneficiaries to just 1.3 million—a decline of 72 percent.

Sources: OCHA, Somalia Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026, OCHA Somalia 2026 Humanitarian Funding Overview (as of July 31, 2026), IPC/FSNAU, analysis for July to December 2026 (September 23, 2026). As of: September 2026.

The DR Congo is experiencing one of the largest and fastest-growing humanitarian crises in the world: according to OCHA data, approximately 14.9 million people will require humanitarian aid in 2026 (based on a revised needs analysis); following major return movements, the IOM still reports around five million internally displaced persons and over five million returnees (as of the end of 2025). In January and February 2025, the Rwanda-backed M23 movement, together with the "Alliance Fleuve Congo," captured the provincial capitals of Goma and Bukavu, and in March, the mining town of Walikale as well; within a few weeks, more than 1.1 million people were displaced or forced to return to destroyed villages.

At the same time, the FDLR, the ADF, and Wazalendo militias continue to carry out attacks in Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu; OCHA documented over 1,300 protection incidents in October 2025 alone, including killings, abductions, and conflict-related sexual violence. In December 2025, fighting in South Kivu continued despite an agreement signed between Kinshasa and Kigali at the end of 2025, displacing another 200,000 people.

The food security situation is catastrophic: around 26.5 million people are suffering from acute food insecurity (IPC 3 or worse, projection for the first half of 2026), particularly concentrated in the eastern provinces. In addition, there are massive disease outbreaks: since May 2026, the largest recorded outbreak of the Bundibugyo virus, for which there is no approved vaccine, has been spreading in the eastern provinces; after the West Africa epidemic from 2013 to 2016, it is the second-largest Ebola outbreak ever. As of September 27, 2026, the Ministry of Health, according to the IOM, reported 8,116 confirmed cases and 3,924 deaths in 63 health zones across seven provinces in the DR Congo; individual cases have also been confirmed in Uganda and France. Furthermore, the WHO registered 22,611 confirmed Mpox cases by May 2025, as well as a severe cholera wave with over 48,000 suspected cases and at least 1,443 deaths between January and August 2025. The UN humanitarian response plan for 2025 is only about 22 percent funded; the shortfall of approximately two billion US dollars primarily affects women, children, and displaced persons in the camps around Goma, whose protection continues to erode.

Sources: OCHA, Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026 (January 2026), IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (end of 2025), IPC (2026), IOM, Bundibugyo Ebola Situation Report No. 20 (as of September 27, 2026), WHO Mpox Situation Report No. 61 (December 22, 2025). As of: October 2026.

Almost five years after the Taliban took power, Afghanistan is one of the world's largest humanitarian crises according to OCHA: 21.9 million people, nearly half the population, require humanitarian aid in 2026, and 17.4 million are suffering from acute food insecurity. The Taliban’s bans on women and girls—including prohibitions on schooling and university, professional bans, the mahram requirement, and the "PVPV" morality law—have further solidified according to UN women’s rights experts and Amnesty International; between July and September 2025 alone, UNAMA documented 21 cases of arbitrary arrest, torture, and ill-treatment, as well as 14 killings of former security and government personnel, despite a declared general amnesty.

In July 2025, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for the Taliban’s "Supreme Leader" and the Chief Justice for alleged crimes against humanity based on gender-based persecution.

A massive returnee crisis is exacerbating the situation: in 2025 alone, UN special rapporteurs reported that over 2.6 million Afghans returned from Iran and Pakistan, including approximately 60 percent women and children; according to Amnesty, Iran deported more than 1.8 million people, many under coercion and often with only a few hours' notice; by September 12, 2026, UNHCR counts recorded another 1.23 million returnees. A major earthquake in Kunar province on August 31, 2025, killed 1,986 people, injured 3,565, and destroyed more than 7,500 homes, according to OCHA data; other natural disasters also claimed over 2,000 lives in 2025. The humanitarian response is being undermined by dramatic funding cuts: the 2025 aid plan was only 17 percent funded by mid-year, more than 420 health facilities were closed, and 80,000 malnourished children and mothers lost access to treatment.

Sources: OCHA, Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026 (December 2025), UNHCR, Afghanistan Situation Data Portal (as of September 12, 2026), OHCHR, Mass deportations from Iran and Pakistan (July 2025), HRW, Afghanistan: Relentless Repression (August 5, 2025). As of: September 2026.

In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, according to assessments by Human Rights Watch, the OHCHR, and independent UN special rapporteurs, systematic state repression continues, which, according to the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (August 2022 report, confirmed by 2024/25 updates), may constitute "international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity." Estimates from independent sources cited by HRW suggest that up to one million people have been arbitrarily detained in "vocational education and training centers" and approximately 500,000 have been sentenced to long prison terms, including numerous intellectuals and religious leaders.

In January 2026, UN special rapporteurs sounded the alarm regarding state-organized "labor transfer programs": Xinjiang’s 2021–2025 five-year plan mandates 13.75 million such transfers, through which Uyghurs, Tibetans, and other minorities are moved under duress to factories, including outside the region. HRW has documented links to aluminum, solar, automotive, and apparel supply chains. Women are specifically placed in low-wage sectors, families are separated, and religious practice, the Uyghur language, and cultural identity continue to be eroded through surveillance, boarding schools, and the closure of mosques.

The freedom of movement for Uyghurs to and from abroad is severely restricted; transnational repression also affects members of the diaspora. International oversight remains denied: Beijing has not granted independent access to UN mechanisms, despite repeated demands by High Commissioner Volker Türk and his predecessor. The legal and political structures that led to mass detention remain, in the assessment of the OHCHR, "largely unchanged."

Sources: HRW, China’s Cover-ups Don’t Hide Unending Abuse for Uyghurs (September 5, 2025), OHCHR, UN Experts Alarmed by Forced Labor (January 2026), HRW, Japan Should Adopt Regulation to Counter Uyghur Forced Labor (February 2026). As of: July 2026.